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between the national units of the individual member nations
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2. Members of the committee: Mt. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer (Alternate: Maris), Fourr0 (Yice$ztrmen);
Mr. Alloncle (Alteraate: Baumet), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Cariglia (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Cox, De Decker, Derycke(Alternate: Kempinaire), Ewing, Fiatdrotti, Fillon, Fioret (Alternate:. Fassino), Irmer, Jung Konen, de Kwaalstenia,
ivlrs. Lalumidre, MM. Pecchioli, Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steircr, Steverlynck (Alternate: Uyttendaele), Sir
John Stokes, Mr. Zierer.
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Rapporteur's Preface
In preparation for his report:
The Rapporteur took part as an observer (on 22nd and 23rd September 1988) in the exercise Free
Lion in the Federal Republic of Germany.
He also had the following interviews:
llth October 1988
Headquarters of the rapid action force (FAR), Maisons-Laffitte, France
General Henry Pr6aud, Commanding Officer, FAR.
The Rapporteurwas also invited to the presentation of the FAR at Canjuers, near Draguignan, on
25th October 1988.
9th and 10th November 1988
SHAPE, Mons, Belgium
General John R. Galvin, United States Army, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
General Sir John Akehurst, United Kingdom Army, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe;
Vice Admiral Fiorenzo Rosso, Italian Navy, Deputy Chief-of-stafl Support;
Rear Admiral James Weatherall, Royal Na"y, Deputy Assistant Chief-of-staff, Operations;
Minister Counsellor Don Gelber, Special Assistant for International Affairs;
Mr. Harry Brown, Special Assistant, Strategic and global events; Captain Nick Paige, Royal Nar.y,
Deputy United Kingdom National Military Representative;
Col. Farrar-Hockley, United Kingdom Army;
Lt. CoL Heidler, Danish Army, Operations Division;
Commander Rath, German Navy, Policy Division.
l4th December 1988
Ministry of Defence, The Hague, Netherlands
Mr. Frits Bolkestein, Minister of Defence;
Rear Admiral H. van Foreest, Director of Personnel, RNLN;
Commodore J.W. Stuurman, Deputy Chief Operations, Naval Staff.
Headquarters HNLMC, Rotterdam, and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, Doorn
Major-General Willem J.I. van Breukelen, Commandant RNLMC;
Col. G.G. \{ssnink, RNLMC, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Doorn.
l1th December 1988
Dutch Parliament, The Hague
Mr. W.F. van Eekelen, former Minister of Defence.
The Rapporteur was invited to attend the inauguration ceremony of the FrancoGerman brigade
which took place in Bhblingen, Federal Republic of Germany, on l2th January 1989.
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After the ceremony, discussions were held with:
General Gilbert Forray, French Army, Chief of the Army Staff;
Lieutenant-General Henning von Ondarza, German Army, Inspector of the Bundeswehr;
Brigadier-General Helmut Willmann, Ministry of Defence, Bonn;
Brigadier-General Jean-Pierre Sengeisen, French Army, Commandant, Franco-German
brigade;
Colonel Gfinther Wassenberg, Germany Army, Deputy Commandant.
24th January 1989
Headquarters 24th Airmobile Brigade, Catterick, Uniled Kingdom
Brigadier A.I.G. Kennedy, OBE, Commanding Officer;
Major Charles Sloane, Gordon Highlanders, Chief-of-Staff.
7th February 1989
NATO Air Base, Geilenkirchen, Federal Republic of Germany
Col. C.M. van den Hoven, RNLAF, Deputy Commander;
Col. Eugene Deibert, USAF, Assistant to the Commander for Special Projects.
In the course of his visit, the Rapporteur was given an in-flight demonstration of the NATO
AWACS (airborne warning and control system).
The committee as a whole held meetings and was briefed as follows:
Norway
13th June 1988
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Oslo
Mr. Dagfin Stenseth, Director, Planning Department.
Storting, Norwegian Parliament, Oslo
Mr. Thor Knudsen (Conservative), Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Defence;
Mr. Rikard Olsvik (Labour Party), Elected Secretary of the Committee on Defence;
Mrs. Marit Lovvig (Conservative), member of the committee;
Mr. Age Ramberg (Christian Democrat), member of the committee;
Mrs. Aud Blattmann (labour Party), member of the committee;
Mr. Hans J. Rosjorde (Party of Progress), member of the committee;
Mrs. Kaci Kullmann Five (Conservative), member of the committee;
Mr. Jan Petersen (Conservative), member of the committee;
Mrs. Ingeborg Botnen (Labour Party), member of the committee.
Institute for Defence Studies
Mr. Olav Riste, Director of the Institute;
Mr. Rolf Tamnes, senior research associate;
Lt. General Tonne Huitfeldt, Strategic Studies Co-ordinator;
Dr. Tomas Ries, research fellow;
Mr. Ragnvald Solstrand, Director of the Defence Research Institute;
Vice Admiral C. Lutken, research associate;
Dr. Finn Sollie, expert consultant;
Captain Gjelsten, Naval Staff College;
Mr. John Kristen Skogan, research fellow, Institute of International Affairs.
MS CARNEVAL, Oslo Fjord




Ministry of Defence, Oslo
Mr. Finn Molvig, Drector-General, Ministry of Defence;
Rear Admiral Per Sollien, Headquarters Defence Command;
Mr. Tom Eidesen, Policy Division;
Captain Arne Sperbund, Headquarters Defence Command.
Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe, Kolsas
Rear Admiral ICJ. Steindofl GE N, Chief-of-Stafl AFNORTH;
Major-General J. Schriver, DA A;
Rear Admiral J. Ruth, DA N;
Brig. General P.J. Rowe, USMC;
Brig. General D.R. Williams, CA AF;
Colonel J.M. von Radowitz, GE A;
Colonel L. Ness, NO A.
CS FINNMARKEN (at sea)
Commodore Per Anton Enghaug, Commanding Officer, Narvik Naval District.
15th June 1988
Headquarters Defence Command Northern Norway, Reitan
Brigadier Alv Midthun, Chief-of-Staff;
Colonel Per Bothun, No AF, Deputy Chief-of-Staff Plans and Operations;
Captain (N) Torbjorn Romul{ No N, Allied Naval Forces North Nonray.
Bodo Main Air Station
Brigadier Egil Omdal, No AF, Commanding Officer Bodo Main Air Station;




Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Folkaing (Danish Parliammt), Copenhagen
(morning)
Mr. Bjoern Elmquist (Liberal), Chairman of the Foreign Atrairs Committee;
Mr. Hans Haekkerup (Social Democrat), member of the committee;
Mrs Ritt Bjerregaard (Social Democrat), member of the committee;
Mr. Anker Soergensen (Social Democrat), member of the committee;
Mr. Hanne Severinsen (Liberal), member of the committee;
Mrs Connie Hedegaard (Conservative), member of the committee;
Mr. Per Stig Moeller (Conservative), member of the committee;
Mr. B. Bollmann (Centre Democrat), member of the committee.
(afiernoon)
Mr. Knud Enggaard, Minister of Defence.
17th June 1988
Defence headquarters, Vedbaek















Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, {JSN, Commandant of the Iceland Defence Force;
Colonel L. Aikman, Operations Officer;
Lieutenant-Colonel R. St. Iaurent, Logistics Officer.
21st June 1988
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Reykiavik
Mr. Helgi Agustsson, Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary;
Mr. Stula Sigurjonsson, First Secretary of the Defence Department.
Althingi (Icelandic Parliament)
Mr. Johann Einvardsson (Progressive Party), Vice-President of the United Althingi;ffi. drdlohannsson (Soclat Democraii.Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Foreign
Affairs;
Mr. Pall Petursson (Progressive Party);
Mr. Ingi Bjorn Albertsson (Citizens Party).
Pingholt
Mr. Hannes Hafstein, Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
United Kingdam
3rd November 1988, London
The Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP, United Kingdom Minister of State for the Armed Forces'
4th November 1988, HQ RAF Strtke Command, High Wycombe
Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, KCB, FRAeS RAF, Air Officer Commanding in Chief;
Air Vice Marshal Anthony Woodford, Chief-otStaff.
France
6th February 1989, Paris
Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevdnement, French Minister of Defence.
Federal Republic of Germany
25th and 26th April 1989, Bonn
Mr. Helmut Schifer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Alfred Biehle, chairman of the Parliamentary Defence committee;
Mr. Willy Wimmer, Parliamentary State Secretary.
The committee and the Rapporteur wish to express their special thanks-tq all the ministers, offi-





on the state of European security 
-
intemention fotces and reitforcemeat for the centre and the north
The Assembly,




Noting-nevertheless that the USSR and its allies are slill maiataining a high level of arms pro-
duction and that the present disarmament agreements have been reacheA by NATO maintaining its own
high level of security and unity of purpose;
(iiy' Recognising that it will be politically difficult to maintain western defence budgets in real terms,
let alone increase them;(iv) Underlining therefore the increased urgency of making as cost eflective as possible existing pro-
curemenL personnel, and command, control and communication systems;(v) 
.Stresslng the key strategic importance to NATO of reinforcement and resupply from North
America to Eu_rope, which itself can act as a deterrent in time of tension, and increases iheimportance of
the northern flanh
Rrcouueuns rHAT rns CouNclr,
Urge member governments to recommend to NATO:
l. That the highest priority be given to improving command, control and communication systems:
(a) frrstly, aircraf identification friend or foe'(IfF) systems, to achieve a high-grade common
standard in NATO air operations which is now long overdue;
(b/ secondly, in interoperability of tactical radio equipment between multinational units;
(c) thtdly, in communication, tactics and doctrine, for better control of the land/air battle;
2. That France be encouraged to join the United Kingdom in taking part with its four Boeing E-3
AWACS ab initio in the training and development of the teams destined for the alliance air de6nce
system aircraft;
3. That in view of the importance of the northern flank in securing maritime and air superiority for
transaflantic reinforcement and resupply, the United Kingdom and ihe Netherlands should reach an
early decision on new amphibious ships;
4. That in view of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the northern flank, apart from their
replacement by other allies, consideration should be given to the skilled elements of the force d'action
rapide being assigned to Norway;
5. That stiU greater efforts be made on weapon and ammunition standardisation, interoperability of
equipment and more cost-effective joint procurement ventures;
6. That through the member countries of WEU the following steps should be taken to give practical
expression to the European pillar of defence:
(a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force
and the Franco-German brigade;
(b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between
countries to enhance their awarenessof European co-operation, give themgreater opportunity
for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve ai a useful iecmiting incentivi:
at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult;
l. That proper recognition and understalding be given to greater concepts of speed and flexibility inEuropean force.s to meet the c,h?lglng situation in Europe. The doctrines and equipment which underly
the force d'action rapide and. 24 Airmobile Brigade are good examples that -could be emulated and




(submitted by Mr. Spee4 Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
I . l. In recent years, the Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments has produced a range
of reports concerning various aspects of Euro-
pean security:
- 
* The state of European security ",
November 1982, Rapporteur: Mr.
Blaauw (Document 936), looked at mar-
itime surveillance, certain national con-
tributions 1s allied defence and conven-
tional weapons and NATO strategy;
- 
o European security and burden-sharingin the alliance ", November 1983,
Rapporteun Mr. Wilkinson (Document
959), dealt with a perennial subject
under the headings ofl the concept of
allied defence, measuring and com-
paring the defence effort, the transat-
lantic debate, the European pillar and
defence production;
- 
' The state of European security ", May
1984, Rapporteun Sir Dudley Smith
(Document 971), considered the impli-
cations of membership of NATO, the
status of indiyidual countries and
intermediate-range nuclear forces;
- 'The state of European security - the
central region', I0l{ay I 985, Rapporteur:
Dr. Miller (Document 1018), reviewed
levels of forces in the central region and
the r6le of allied forces on the central
front.
Other reports have provided regular updating of
the situation in the Mediterranean (the southern
flank) (the latest being Document 1073, October
1986, Rapporteur Mr. Kittelmann), and further
afield.
1.2. The aim of this present report is:
(a) to examine aspects of allied rein-
forcement for the central region and
the north, in the light of current ideas
regarding intervention forces generally
and bi- and multilateral co-operation
in particular;
(b) totignt;ght various problem areas and
propose possible solutions.
1.3. Producing such a report as this in the
context of today's rapidly evolving political situ-
ation is no easy matter. Initiatives and proposals
abound, for example, as East and West
maneuwe on the arms control scene. There are
indications that we may be about to enter a state
of" super-detente " in Europe and nobody hopes
that this may be so more fervently than your
Rapporteur.
1.4. However, whatever oneos hopes for the
future, there is no escaping today's realities
which remain major preoccupations for we
Western Europeans, especially where our defence
is concerned. We all trust that the present spirit
of good-will and openness will prevail and be
translated into genuine acts to reduce and even-
tually remove any perceived threat. That
* trust " will be eroded, however, if capabilities
are not modified to match recently-declared
intentions. In another report (" Current aspects
of arms control ", Rapporteur: Mr. de Beer),
being prepared in parallel with this one, these
changing dimensions and relationships are
examined in detail and recommendations made
which should help achieve' super-d6tente " eyen
more quickly, if implemented by the Council.
1.5. Meanwhile, the Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments has also to consider
the present setting, where in the context of
reducing working populations, sometimes fal-
tering national economies and changing public
attitudes towards defence, the governments of
member countries and other NATO allies have
to make important decisions in order to secure
the best use of diminishing resources.
1.6. In 1988, the committee was invited by the
governments and parliaments of Denmark,
Iceland and Norway to make a fact-finding visit
to those countries to see some of the problems of
the " northern' areas at first hand and for
exchanges of views on the state of European
security. Although none of the countries con-
cerned is a member of Western European Union,
it is worthy of note that the visit took place in the
run-up to Portugal and Spain's membership of
the organisation and that a great deal ofinterest
was shown in Denmark and Norway, by both
parliamentarians and the media, in the condi-
tions for WEU membership. This subject is con-
sidered further in a current report being prepared
by the General Affairs Committee on 'The
future of European security'', Rapporteur: Mr.
van der Sanden.
II. Geography
2.1. Alliance interests in the northern flank
area centre on NATO's Northern European
Command which is one of the major subordinate
commands of Allied Command Europe. This is a
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region of contrasts. From Kirkenes on the
Barents Sea to the River Elbe, the command
stretches for 2 800 km and comprises Norway,
Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg
north of the Elbe in the Federal Republic of
Germany. In the north it borders the Soviet
Union and Finland; to the east is neutral Sweden
and the Baltic Sea, while the south-east boundary
is the inner German border. The Norwegian
archipelago of Svalbard, the island of Jan Mayen
and the Danish territories of Greenland and
the Farses are all under the responsibility of the
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
(SACLANT) and so is the major part of the Nor-
wegian economic zone. Iceliand also has a key
geographical position and r6le in alliance
defence.
2.2. The coastline of Nonray runs for thou-
sands of kilometres with its hundreds of large
and small fiords and inlets. The land area of the
country presents a rugged picture with innu-
merable hills, vallsys and mountains an4 for
both geographical and economic reasong rail
and road communications are limited. On the
whole the area is very narrow with many fiords
and south of Narvik, for example, Norway is no
more than 7 km wide. Denmark and Schleswig-
Holstein on the other hand present a contrast
with flat plains and only a few natural defence
barriers. Compared with Norway their rail and
road communications are good.
2.3. The Commandant General of Britain's
Royal Marines, Lieutenant General Sir Martin
Garro4 in an interview for NATO's Sixteen
Nations, sums up the situation in the north:
" The problems that we face in arctic oper-
ations are those out of our control. Firsfly
climate, which means that all our men
have to be trained and equipped to fight in
the Norwegian winter. It is not so much
the cold which is the problem but rather
the variation in conditions caused by the
effect of the Gulf Stream. In North
Norway in January and February, for
example, the temperature may be 
- 
30 0C
or lower, or it may be + 5 0C and raining.
A cold dry man can figbt indefinitely, a
cold wet man will rapidly become a
casualty. The terrain, particularly in the
north, is rugged. This makes cross-country
movement difficult and tends to canalise
vehicles and tracks along valleys, which of
course favours the defender. Inland com-
munications, road and rail, are tenuous.
The main trunk road, the E6, running
from Finmark to Oslo is in places tortuous
and wlnerable, and the single track
railway snniag north from Oslo termi-
nates at Bodo, some two-thirds of the way
up Norway. The coastline is vast some
13 000 km long indented by innurnsla6ls
fords and scattered with some 150000
islands. This coast does however give us
an infinite number of landing areas, pro-
tection from the elements and the enemy,
and allows us a waterborne means of tac-
tical and logistic movement.'
2.4. Norway (323 886 sq. km) has a population
of just over 4 alillion, Denmark (43 069 sq. km)
has a population of 5 million and Schleswig-
Holstein and Hamburg (16 zmO sq. km) together
have a population of 4.5 million. Thus, the popu-
lation of the whole area amounts to about 14
million compared to the more than 100 million
inhabitants in both the central and southern
regions of NATO in Europe.
2.5. The Northern European Command would
be of crucial importance in a war between the
Warsaw Pact and NATO. It stretches across a
third of the European NATO area, dominates the
sea routes from the Baltic in the south and in the
north from the Barents Sea into the Atlantic. It
also sits astride the direct air routes from Central
Russia to the North American continent. It pro-
vides important early-warning facilities and
would constitute an important base for allied
counter-offensive operations.
III. Defence forces in the arua
(a) Norwegian forees
3.1. In Norway military training of soldiers
and partly also of non-commissioned officers is
based on general conscription. A certain per-
centage of regulars is recruited for special units
and tasks. The national service period is
12 months (plus four call-ups for refresher-
training) for the army and 15 months for the
navy and the air force.
3.2. The Norwegian land forces will amount to
some 225000 men on mobilisation. The
standing land forces are, however, limited to
North Norway. These forces are well-trained and
-equipped and the brigade in North Norway(Troms) is supported by medium tanks and
medium artillery. In South Norway the standing
units consist of His Majesty the King's guard bat-
talion, one medium tank squadron and some
other minor units. On mobilisation, an addi-
tional 12 brigades will be called up. The local
defence forces mobilised in battalion or
company groups comprise another 100 000 men.
To this should be added some 85 000 men of the
home guard.
3.3. Types of aircraft at present in use in the
Royal Norwegian Air Force are the F-16, F-5,
P-3B Orion (maritime patrol), C-130H transport
and the UH-1B Sea King (SAR) and Lynx heli-
copters. At present the air force has five
squadrons of combat aircraft. In addition, there
are one squadron of helicopters for army support
and one transport squadron. Norway is partici-
pating in NATO's airborne early-warning project
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and has a forward-operating facility for the force
of l8 aircraft at Oerland air base at Trondelag(Mid-Norway). A number of airfields have been
built in Norway, financed nationally and under
the NATO infrastructure programme. Others
have been and are being extended and modern-
ised.
3.4. The main operational area for the Royal
Norwegian Navy is North Nonray. The Nor-
wegian naval forces consist of five frigates, two
corvettes, 14 submarines, 46 fast patrol boats
(missile and torpedo/gun boats). two mine-layers,
nine mine-sweepers and one mine-hunter, seven
landing craft and a support ship. Naval manning
in peacetime is at 700/0. The main naval base is at
Haakonsvern in Bergen on the west coast (South
Norway). In North Nonvay there are smaller
bases at Ramsund and near Tromso (Olavsvern)
and a substantial number of coastal artillery for-
tresses. The coastguard has its main base at
Sortland in North Norway. Five coastguard
ships, three of them carrying a helicopter, are
manned by military personnel.
(b) Danish forces
3.5. In Denmark one-third of the peacetime
anny are volunteers, whereas the augmentation
force and the mobilisation force consist of con-
scripts with a training of nine to 12 months. Con-
scripts can be called up for refresher-training for
atotal of 60 days during the first nine years after
their initial training period. Beyond this, they
can be called up for short-time musters. The
Danish Defence Act of 1985 provides for a per-
sonnel peacetime strength of the army of 13 000
men, 7 000 of whom form the staading force
consisting of volunteers only. The 6 000 soldiers
of the augrnentation force are in a high state of
readiness and can be called up at very short
notice without implementing any alert or
mobilisation measures. In a time of tension, the
standing force, reinforced by the augmentation
force, will form the covering force of about
13 000 men. The total strength of the wartime
army, after mobilisation of the field army reserve
and the local defence forces, is about 72000
officers and men and a home guard of approxi-
mately 78 000 
- 
or all in all 150 000 men.
3.6. The peacetime standing force is organised
in five annoured infantry brigades - the three in
Jutland forming a division, two battalions and
the Bornholm combat goup. These are partly
manned but they possess all thek operational
equipment. The requisite fue-power and heavy
equipment is thereby maintained at n high stsfs
of readiness and the integration of mobilisation
forces is consequently made easier. After mobil-
isation, these forces would be built up to full
wartime strength. Two brigades would be formed
- 
three regimental combat teams and seven
regions with from one to four infantry battalions
all supported by artillery, engineers and anti-tank
units. Their equipment totals 200 medium tanks,
48 light tanks, 650 armoured personnel carriers,
72 self-propelled howitzers and a number of heli-
copters.
3.7. For the Danish navy the following
minimum force objectives are established: two
destroyers, three corvettes, five fishery-protec-
tion ships with helicopters, 16 fast patrol boats,
three submarines, seven mine-layers, three mine-
sweepers, eight small submarine-hunting vessels,
26 other vessels and light helicopters (although
not all ships are in commission continuously). A
new construction programme to meet these
objectives is now in progress. Naval shore estab-
lishments include three naval bases, fortresses,
coastal and mobile radars and combat divers.
Wartime personnel strength is about 10 0@ to
which should be added some 4 300 navy home
guard men and women.
3.8. Royal Danish Air Force units are available
in a high state of preparedness in peacetime.
There are now 89 fighters in four squadrons of
F-16 and two squadrons of F-35 Draken. Addi-
tionally, the air force maintains eight l-Hawk
missile squadrons and a number of transport and
inspection'planes and rescue helicopters. The air
force's activities are supported by a modern
control and warning system and the Danish air
defence system operates within the framework of
NATO's air defence ground environment
(NADGE) system. NADGE operates 24 hours a
day in a high state of readiness and consists, in
addition to the planes and missiles, of a control
and warning system which includes a number of
radar stations, for example, one on Bomholm
well to the east. Denmark also participates in the
NATO airborne early-warning project in which
long-range surveillance and early warning is
made possible by airborne radar coverage.
(c) Gernwt lorcu (wrthern Germany)
3.9. The military forces of the Federal
Republic of Germany stationed in Schleswig-
Holstein and Hamburg, north of the River Elbe,
consist offorces ofall three services (halfofthem
are conscripts with a service period at present of
15 months, increasing shortly to 18 months). The
army is primarily represented by the Sixth
Armoured Infantry Division (headquarters at
Neumunster) with about24 000 men (peace- and
wartime strength) which is the largest in the
Bundeswehr. This division consists of two
armoured infantry brigades, one armoured
brigade and the Home Defence Brigade 51 (the
latter due for disbandment under the " army
2000' project). Besides conventional artillery
battalions, the artillery regiment of the Sixth
Armoured Infantry Division includes a Lance
battalion. An air defence regiment forms also
part of the divisional troops.
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3.10. Air forces in Schleswig-Holstein assigned
to Northern Europe Command include two light
fighter bomber squadrons at Husum and two all-
weather reconnaissance squadrons at leck.
Types of aircraft at present in use are the
Alphalet and the RF4E. The German naval
forces consist of seven destroyers, nine frigates,
six of them with helicopters, five smaller anti-
submarine patrol boats, 40 fast patrol boats, 57
mine-sweepers/hunters, 19 landing craft. and, 24
submarines. In addition, the German naval air
arm has three attack squadrons and a reconnais-
sance squadron equipped with the sophisticated
Tornado aircraft and two reconnaissance
squadrons of Breguet-Atlantic maritime patrol
aircraft. Additionally, the naval air arm operates
22 Sea King helicopters in the search and rescue
r6le, 19 Dornier-28 liaison aircraft and 12 Sea
Lynx helicopters which operate from the six
frigates. The naval wartime personnel strength is
62 500.
3.11. In order to relieve NATO land forces of
certain tasks, units of the territorial army which
in peace and war are under national command
and control are formed in Schleswig-Holstein
with a wartime strength of about 20 000 men.
Their r6le will be considered further on in this
report when the Franco-German brigade is men-
tioned.
(d) Iceland
3.12. As Iceland has no mililary forces of its
own, a defence agreement was concluded with
the United States in l95l under which the
United States undertakes the defence of Iceland
on behalf of NATO. The Iceland Defence Force
is established at Keflavik, outside Reykjavit the
capital of Iceland. This force comprises a
squadron of 18 F-15 Eagle interceptors and a
squadron of two E-3A Sentry AWACS aircraft(airborne early warning). For maritime surveil-
lance and anti-submarine operations, the force
also operates a squadron of nine P-3C Orion
maritime surveillance aircraft. In addition, there
are three HH-3 search-and-rescue helicopters
and two C-130 for search operations, as well as a
KC-135 tanker. A special unit is responsible for
defence of the affield until the arrival of desig-
nated reinforcements from the United States. A
unit of the United States anny reserve has been
trained and prepared to move to Iceland in times
of crisis or in war. In the defence force there is a
total of about 3 100 men. In addition, someI 100 Icelanders are employed by the force.
3.13. So as to counter the growing Soviet threat
in the Norwegian Sea over the past years, Iceland
has approved SACLANT's plan for improv-
ement of maritime surveillance, radar coverage
and air defence of Iceland. These improvements
include modernisation of existing radar stations
on the southern coast oflceland and the building
of two new stations on the north coast, as well as
shelter hangars for fighter aircaft and protective
facilities for the command and control functions
at the headquarters. The new measures also
include Dutch P-3C maritime surveillance air-
craft with crews and maintenance personnel sta-
tioned at Keflavik on a rotation basis and also a
number of allied staffofficers who are integrated
into the staffof the defence force. There are cur-
rently Americans, Canadians, Danes, Dutchmen,
Norwegians, and now a British officer, working
in the Iceland Defence Force headquarters.
3.14. The NATO base at Keflavik, including the
defence force, plays a vital r6le as far as air
defence, maritime surveillance and early warning
for the whole Norwegian Sea area are concerned.
In an emergency, the base would be of decisive
importance for maintaining communication
across the Atlantic and for bringing forward rein-
forcements to Norway and to Denmark.
IY. Assistance from the allits
4.1. The defence forces of the Northern
European Command are limited in number and
it is appreciated that they would need assistance
from the outside to resist a powerful and deter-
mined aggressor.
4.2. The strategically important area of north
Norway has liule by way of permanent infra-
structure, such as roads, ports, or hospitals, to
support either a large permanent garrison or a
large inllux of reinforcements. In addition,
although Norway's sgading forces are by pro-
portion of population as large of those of the
United States, the country cannot be adequately
defended without intensive mobilisation and
strong reinforcement from outside. In the area of
the Baltic approaches the infrastructure is admit-
tedly much more developed, but the total popu-
lation is still small and an adequate defence can
only be achieved by the timely arrival of suitable
reinforcements.
4.3. Firstly, mention should be made of NATO
deterrent forces which mlght be deployed to the
area early in a period oftension. These are:
(a) thLe Allied Command Europe Mobile
Force (air and land);
(b) the Standing Naval Force Atlantic(STANAVFORLAN',T).
Both these forces have a primary deterrent r6le
in demonstrating NATO's solidarity and making
it quite clear that an attack against one membei
is an attack against all.
4.4. SACEUR's rapid reinforcement plan allo-
cates priorities for the arrival of reinforcements
in Europe and the following forces from outside





from the United Kingdom an anny
brigade (United Kingdom mobile force)
for operations in the Baltic approaches;
- 
from the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands together an amphibious
force consisting of up to four marine
infantry battalions with their own
combat and logistic support. This force
is trained and equipped for cold weather
operations and exercises in Nonray
annually during the winter months;
- 
from the United States a strong marine
expeditionary force which mlght consist
of up to 50 000 men with 160 fighters(including air national guard squa-
drons), and ground attack aircraft, 50
attack and 180 transport helicopters, 70
tanks, 100 artillery pieces and a pow-
erful anti-tank and anti-air capability. It
is hoped that strong air support from
the North Atlantic Carrier Battle Group
would also be available;
- 
from Canada an air-sea transportable
brigade group fully Arctic-trained and
-equipped (some 5 000 men). However,
as announced in the Canadian white
paper in 1987, it is intended to
withdraw this commitment to north
Norway later this year and instead
increase Canadian presence in southern
Germany. The hope is to replace the
CAST brigade with a NATO composite
force of four battalions (two artillery,two infantry), plus a helicopter
squadron. These forces would be sent
from Canada, the Federal Republic, the
United Kingdom and the United States,
and should result in a slightly increased
overall capability, although co-ordina-
tion will be more of a problem.
4.5. The northern flank is the potential
'o Achilles Heel ' of the alli4ass, rrnless adequate
forces are forthcoming to support the Northern
European Command. Elements of the NATO
airborne early-warning force, as well as the
United States strategic air command aircraft
from adjacent commands, are essential. Thus, to
an aggressor, these forces represent a joint
NATO defence organisation and not just the
fimited national defence assets of Denmarlg
Norway and the northern part of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
Y. The Nordic balance
5.1. In this northern region, the Scandinavian
dimension or Nordic balance must also be
examined. The relationship between the NATO
countries of lceland, Denmark and Norway with
Finland, and especially Sweden, cannot be
ignored. It is based on long-standing historical
and cultural links. The " non-nuclear " and
'non-basing nuclear " policies of Norway and
Denmark receive considerable comment, but in
reality they reflect an agxeement which was made
as far back as 1949, accepted then by all parties,
and in part served to show the consideration that
Norway and Denmark feel is owed to their
Nordic neighbours.
5.2. In military terrns it is important to
remember the effect on the defence of the
northern region of developments in Sweden and
Finland. At present the Soviets probably stand to
lose more than they would gain by any incursion
by land or air into Swedish territory. However,
continued cuts in the defence budget have
resulted in a considerable weakening of the
Swedish forces over the past two decades. The
cost of " armed neutrality " is high and it
remains to be seen whether current and planned
expenditure will be sufficient to provide the form
of guarantee that the Swedes have hitherto relied
on.
5.3. In Finland last year a 100/o increase in the
defence budget was announced. This is particu-
larly unusual at a time when most other nations
are finding difficulty in maintaining even present
levels of defence expenditure.
5.4. In spite of their respective positions, both
the Finns and the Swedes must present an
unknown quantity to a potential aggressor. The
routes through and over Sweden and Finland to
the northern region present an attractive propo-
sition perhaps, but the possible hazards of any
incursion would be difficult for the Soviets to
quantiS and, in reality, they add yet another
unknown for their military planners. It is true,
however, that the possibility of a major assault
on southern Norway during the early stages of a
conflict might well be increased as Swedish
defences weaken.
5.5. C.ommander-indhiefAllid Forces Northern
Europe considers that his forces are outnum-
bered by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact arsenal
which with increasing sophistication and tech-
nical advances has caught up with the West in
most areas. In the northern area the Soviet aims
are assessed as being firstly to safeguard their
strategic submarine force and its bases on the
Kola peninsula and then to contest NATO's vital
sea-line of communication across the North
Atlantic. It is felt that they would want at the
very least to control the vital airfields and port
installations in north Norway.
5.6. The allied concept of defence is firmly
based on the defence and denial of these areas
which are seen as crucial to probable Soviet
objectives. In the Baltic area, the Warsaw Pact
initial aims would surely be to gain control of the
straits, firstly thsrrgh air superiority and even-
tually to drive a wedge between the north and
central regions of Allied Command Europe, thus
ll
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gving access to the reinforcement and resupply
bases in the United Kingdom and rear areas.
5.7. In the Baltic approaches the allied concept
is full forward defence, both on the land where
the forward areas offer the best positions for
defence and at sea in the Baltic itself. South
Norway is the Commander-in-Chiefs base, pro-
viding a secure area in which to receive rein-
forcements and supplies for redeployment to
either north or south of the area, as necessary.
5.8. The Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces
Northern Europe (General Sir Geoftey Howlett),
in an article for " NATO's Sixteen Nations ", has
recently summed up his main preoccupations
under the heading * Future considerations ":
'The viability of the allied defence of the
northern flank will, as with the rest of
Europe, depend to a major extent on the
outcome of current and future changes in
East-West relationships. For the past 40
yeani our security has been based on a firm
defensive posture, based very strongly on
the ultimate deterrent of nuclear weapons.
In the past few months, the basic tenet of
our defence has been questioned- The with-
drawal of interrrediate-range nuclear forces
from Europe has had little direct effect on
the northern regon, since none were posi-
tioned on our tenitory. However, within
weeks of the sigring of the INF treaty, the
stratqgic picture did change, and we saw a
new deployment of Yankee-class Soviet sub,
marines, in the north Norwegian and
Barents Seas, newly converted to fire sea-
launched cruise missiles.
The concepts of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika'
should be welcomed as an indication that
the Soviets at last recosnise values which
western society has long upheld, or, more
likely, respect our 40 years of reasonable
solidarity. The suddenness of the change
has, however, been disarming, figuratively
if not yet literally. It is only natural that
the western public should want to see an
elimination of the means of their
destruction.
Our main task in the immediate future is to
maintain a positive effort in the field of
public information in order to avoid mis-
conceptions about NATO strategy, to dis-
prove myths, such as those concerning the
r6le of nuclear weapons or nuclear-free
zones.
Budgetary constraints are not new within
NATO as a whole or the northern region
in particular. We have always had to make
economies and take difficult decisions,
but, with a public perception of a dimin-
ishing threat, this will become even more
difficult.
Pressures on training, particularly low-
level flyrng training, will no doubt
increase. In this respect, we are more for-
tunate than our partners in the central
region 
- 
we have considerably more room
to fly in than they do. Nevertheless, there
are real concerns over environmental
issues, especially in north Norway,
Zealand and Schleswig-Holstein. The
requirement for realistic training by all our
reinforcing nations puts a great strain, not
only on the local area and population, but
also on the relatively small staffs and
forces of the local commanders.
The declining figures of available man-
power will put gtreater pressures on the
armed services of all our nations.
Germany has had to increase the period of
service of her conscripts to maintain ade-
quate force levels and, once again, these
sort of measures are only likely to be
acceptable to the public for as long as they
can be convinced of the necessity, which
means the threat.
During what will be a politically and mili-
tarily uncertain period, the strategic
importance of the northern flank will be
undiminished. In the face of the certainty
of a continued decline in resources and
assets, we must strive to improve our
capability rather th-n expect increases in
numbers. The basic defence concept will
not change, but we must ensure that our
forces are manned, traine4 equipped and
supplied to enable us to sustain operations
over a lengthy period. Perhaps we may
need to place a greater emphasis on mobile
and flexible forces, such as marines or
heliborne troops, and if we are to make the
best use of support from external maritime
and air forces, we must ensure that we
have the appropriate command and
control arrangements ready and in being.
Above all, there remains





region of a continued requirement for sub-
stantial investment in defence. They must
be convinced that the threat has in no way
diminished, and that until it has done so,
any lessening of allied determination and
resolve could prove fatal-
Your Rapporteur can but strongly echo General
Howlett's sentiments, especially concerning
mobile and flexible forces and appropriate
command and control arrangements. What
might some of the possibilities be to try and
improve the situation?
VI. Reinforcements
6.1. The vast area and the small indigenous
population mean that the northern region is
forced to rely heavily on reinforcements to create
t2
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a credible and capable defence. These reinforce-
ments are not only necessary militarily, but espe-
cially politically, as they provide essential extra
defensive assets and, more particularly, a dem-
onstration of the alliance's intention to defend its
territory.
6.2. Several changes in reinforcement planning
have taken place in the past two years. In north
Nonvay, while only one brigade and a strong gar-
rison force are available as * ready " forces, Nor-
wegian gtround forces can be quickly mobilised
and deployed. In terms of pure numbers, they are
reasonably strong and, while extra land forces
would be important, especially from a political
viewpoint, the real necessity is for sophisticated
weaponry and, more particularly, air-power.
SACEUR's rapid reinforcement plan should
produce a fourfold increase in available air assets
in a short time. If, in addition, SACLANT's
striking fleet could cross the Atlantic and operate
as planned from close to the Norwegian coast,
the original assets could well be increased by a
factor of eight. For the land battle, after the with-
drawal of the Canadian air/sea-transported
brigade 
- 
Norway's only dedicated land rein-
forcements 
- 
plans are now in hand to form a
new * NATO composite force " with units from
several nations (see Chapter IV). This will
provide the necessary indications of multina-
tional dedication to the alliance and support for
Norway. However, reception ilTangements for
potential reinforcements, such as the United
States Marine Corps Fourth Marine Expedi-
tionary Brigade and the United Kingdom-
Netherlands amphibious force, still show some
deficiencies. In particular, the ability to conduct
the mine counter-measure operations and anti-
submarine warfare escort duties necessary to
ensure their safe arrival, must be considerably
improved. Unfortunately these are deficiencies
which are equally apparent in other areas of the
alliance.
6.3. In Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein there
are similar overall requirements. Maritime
resources here, coupled with the powerful
German naval air arrn, are probably strong
enorrgh to give a good account of themselves in
the Baltic. The main problem concerns the vital
land battle in Schleswig-Holstein. Even if the
Jutland Division and the United Kingdom
mobile force could reach the defence area in time
to support the strong Sixth German Division the
alliance's ability to hold the overwhelmingly
superior strength of the Warsaw Pact conven-
tional forces for any length of time must be ques-
tioned. The Ninth United States Infantry
Dvision is supposed to reinforce this particular
area, but even with that the Commander Baltic
Approaches will probably still need a further
manoeuwe force, preferably an armoured one, if
a cohesive defence is to be maintained.
YII. Command and control 
- 
northem region
7.1. Command and control arrangements are
probably more complicated in the North
European Command than in any other region of
Allied Command Europe. Whilst Headquarters
Baltic Approaches in Jutland is a fully estab-
lished allied headquarters in peacetime, in
Norway the two commands will remain under
national control until transfer ofauthority occurs
during transition to war. The present arrange-
ments seem to work well during exercises, but
the system, although workable, is not ideal. It is
important that the command structure within
the region is seen to be a reliable organisation,
particularly when it might affect the confidence
of the reinforcing nations. The system is further
complicated by the number and nature of
adjacent commands. To the south there is
AFCENT with an overlapping tactical air force
boundary. At sea, close liaison must be kept with
CINCHAN and CINCEASTLANT. In the air,
CINCUKAIR'S area is adjacent and, when the
striking and amphibious fleets arrive in the
areas, the command and control arrangements,
particularly air space management, become very
complex. Even the necessary physical means of
communication and transmission of information
to overcome the potential difficulties and make
the best use of these various assets is still lacking.
A great deal ofwork has been done, such as the
development of a co-ordinated concept of opera-
tions between AFNORTH and the striking fleet
and, through an improved command structure,
for land forces in northern Norway, but a great
deal remains to be done.
7.2. The same problems from the northern
region are found throughout the alliance. Most of
the time there is a sincere willingness among the
people concerned to co-operate (this was
particuarly true of the Dutch sponsored exercise
Free Lion, to which your Rapporteur was invited
as an observer in September 1988) and it is
increasingly important that the exchanges of per-
sonnel take place between allies to prepare that
co-operation (see Appendix).
7.3. There are many technological develop-
ments, some of which are being brought into
service faster occasionally than they may be
assimilated (the report by the Committee on Sci-
entific, Technological and Aerospace Questions
on " New technologies and their implications for
European defence ", Rapporteur: Mr. van der
Werfl refers), but there is a desperate need for
progress in particular areas of command and
control (especially communications and' identi-
fication friend or foe'{Ittp; systems), if concepts
such as close air support or air-mobility of forces
are not to become dismal failures of misunder-
standing These are real preoccupations which
affect all levels, from supreme allied com-
manders to private soldiers... The technological
aspects ofthis vital problem area are being given
13
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timely consideration in another report of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer-
ospace Questions on * Developments in
command, control, communications and intelli-
gence ", Rapporteur: Mr. Hill.
YIII. Specifrc forces
(a) British eoiltelrts ofair mobility)l
8.1. Your Rapporteur is the first to wish Mr.
Gorbachev well in his efforts to restructure and
reorientate his military doctrine for a more
defensive posture, but at present the Warsaw
Pact relies heavily on the concentration of
massive force to overwhelm an opponent's
defences and achieve a breakthrough. A concept
to counter this threat is obviously essential,
therefore, and the more flexible the defence, the
better.
8.2. A key element of alliance defence is the
ability to stop enemy forces, particularly their
armoured divisions, should they penetrate the
front line, using mobile reserves with a powerful
anti-tank component.
8.3. Helicopter-borne forces are ideal for this
purpose. The axis of an enemy advance would
not be known until very shortly before his attack
began. Until then the defending forces would be
faced with several possible lines of attack; and
the task of identifoing the main axis of advance
would be made more difficult by the enemy's use
of feints and deception to disguise his intentions.
To be effective, allied arrroured reserves would
have to be committed early to the battle, possibly
before the enemy's intention was clear, whereas
airmobile forces could be held back and moved
swiftly into position when required.
8.4. In 1984, 6 Brigade of l(BR) Corps, based
at Soest, was tasked with conducting trials of a
doctrine for airmobile operations in close
co-operation with the RAF. The doctrine, as
developed, involved the use of RAF Puma and
Chinook helicopters to move men and
equipment into concealed positions behind the
NATO front line at the point where an imminent
enemy breakthrough had been identified. The
infantry is armed with Milan 
- 
the army's
medium-range man-portable anti-tank system.
They are supported with TOW 
- 
the longer-
range wire-guided anti-tank missile. The consid-
erable anti-tank power of these combined forces
would be brought to bear on the enemy as the
allied front line was breached. The aim would be
to disrupt and halt the armoured advance,
allowing time for allisd tanks to move in and
complete the destruction of enemy formations or
force a retreat.
l. See United Kingdom statement on the defence estimates
1988.
8.5. The success ofthis trial over the past four
years has produced a doctrine for airmobile oper-
ations, and identified procedures and equipment,
which will allow these operations to be
developed into the next century. 24 Brigade has
now begun conversion to the airmobile r6le in
place of 6 Brigade; it will include an Army Air
Corps regiment equipped with both anti-tank
and utility Lynx helicopters supported by the
RAFs troop-carrying and heavy-lift helicopters.
The EH-101 is intended to succeed the Puma in
these r6les in the 1990s, provided it fulfils the
necessary criteria.
8.6. As yet, unlike the French force d'action
rapide, 24 Brigade's helicopter assets are not ded-
icated solely to its needs; which is not the most
satisfactory situation, given the range of battle-
field imperatives which are already apparent.
Reaction time is paramount for successful action
and any airmobile unit's ability to block an
attack or strike quickly.
8.7. British and German Ministries of Defence
are presently considering ways and means
towards greater bilateral co-operation and one
such avenue with good potential may be the for-
mation of an Anglo-German airmobile division(the beginning of Chancellor Kohl's * European
Division "?). Such a possibility, based on the
German Anny's 'Bundeswehr 2000' concept
and the ideas being developed in Britain's 24
Brigade, would not only result in a more
coherent use of scarce resources (both human
and material), but might have very far-reaching
consequences which would be of particular
interest to us in Western European Union.
(b) Ihe French force d'action rapide
8.8. Created in 1985, some 46 O00-strong and
including the 4th Airmobile Divison, the force
d'action rapide (FAR), or 'rapid action force',
is steadily becoming the outward and visible sign
of French commitment to her ellies.
8.9. The FAR mustem the following equipment
240 helicopten (Fumas and Gazelles,
including 90 Gazelles mounting the Hot
missile);
820 arrroured vehicles (210 with guns);
110 Hot missile launchers mounted on
armoured vehicles;
500 Milan anti-tank missile systems;
230 artillery (155 mm) and mortar (120
mm) pieces;
4 000 APILAS anti-tank rocket systems.
8.10. As well as a headquarters element, the
FAR includes communication and command
ulits, a logistic brigade and a total of five divi-
slons:
- 
the 4th Airmobile Division;
- 




the 9th Marine Infantry Division;
- 
the I lth Parachute Division;
- 
the 27th Alpine Division.
The headquarters are at Maisons-Laffitte and the
divisions are based at Nancy, Nimes, Nantes,
Toulouse and Grenoble.
8.1l. The French Government sees the FAR as
reinforcing European security and demonstrating
French willingness to support her allies. The
essential plus factor of the FAR is its potential
capacity to intervene quickly, thanks to its own
integrated helicopter lift and essential mobility.
The necessary logistic support to give the FAR
'longer legs' and increased sustainability now
must follow if the force is really to take its place
alongside the allies.
8.12. This vital consideration of "just where(and when) the FAR might fit in' in alliance
terms is crucial, but probably remains
unsolvable politically for the present. Joint exer-
cises involving elements of the FAR have taken
place in co-operation with Germany (especially
Kecker Spatz in the autumn of 1987) and are
projected with British forces also (although not
where such co-operation would be most useful,
in NORTHAG). Increased Franco-British co-
operation in the airmobile domain, given present
ideas on both sides, would be logical and feasible
and might produce a spin-off into other realms,
such as equipment procurement as well.
8.13. One particular area where some elements
of the FAR have been involved on a bilateral
basis concerns alpine troops. Both last year and
again in 1989, detachments of the 7th battalion
of the Alpine Division have exchanged combat
sections with their Norwegian opposite numbers.
Given also the historical association of the
French with Narvik, this type of initiative is to
be strongly encouraged, even if not developed
formally. The presence of French forces in
northern areas (and including eventually naval
and air force elements) would be very welcome
from every point of view.
(e) The United Kingtum-Naherlands landing force
8.14. The force is the first permanent form ofbi-
national co-operation between the amphibious
forces of rwo NATOflMEU member nations. In
1972 a memorandum of understanding was
signed between the British and Dutch Govern-
ments and Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
forces were assigned to the United Kingdom-
Netherlands landing force for NATO operations.
Co-operation and integration between the two
corps have developed to such an extent since
1972 that organisation, equipment and training
are basically identical.
8.15. During times of conflict or war, the United
Kingdom-Netherlands landing force (roughly a
brigade-size unit) is under the command of the
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic when at
sea. By its amphibious nature, it is a mobile force
and, thereby, not dedicated to a single deploy-
ment area, for example, northern Norway, evenif this is where the force exercises most fre-
quently. Plans to withdraw the Canadian air-sea
transportable brigade from Nonvay have
renewed political interest in the issue of force
dedication, although dedication to one
deployment area is not always desirable from a
military point of view. However much it can
demonstrate political commitment, it could
deprive an amphibious force of its flexibility and
make its deployment too predictable.
(i) The British contribution
8.16. The British Royal Marines are some
7 O0O-strong (all regulars) split into two forma-
tions: " commando forces - and * training,
reserve and special forces " (which also controls
nearly 1 200 Royal Marines reservists). The bulk
of the operational units serve with the 3rd Com-
mando Brigade and consist of three Royal
Marine Commandos plus a RM Air Squadron
(Gazelle helicopters) and a Royal Artillery com-
mando regimeng as well as the usual support ele-
ments. The prime r6le of these'o sea-soldiers " is
to project maritime power ashore and to this end
regular exercises are undertaken with many other
NATO allies (including Norwegians, Danes,
Germans, Americans, Canadians and the
French), but particularly the Dutch through the
United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force.
(ii) The Dutch contribution
8.17. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps has
a current strength of roughly 3 000 officers and
enlisted men; about 850/o of the corps consists of
regular personnel and l5o/o are conscripted
national servicemen. Nearly all officers and non-
commissioned officers are regulars with initial
terms of service of seven years and four years
respectively. This high percentage of well-trained
personnel enables the corps to expand its ranks
quickly by calling up approximately 4 000
reserves when necessary. The corps is augmented
by men from the fleet 
- 
medical, dental,logistic,
lsligious and administrative personnel.
8.18. The largest unit in the RNLMC is an
amphibious combat group (ACG). An ACG is a
battalion-sizs lighl amphibious infantry unit
with ligbt supporting arms. The ACG is not
vehicle-dependent for it has no tanks, heli-
copters, or armoured amphibious vehicles. Small
landing craft usually support amphibious opera-
tions. In mountainous terrain, the group operates
on foot or on skis and snow-shoes. [n peacetime,
two ACGs are operational; in wartime, a third
would be mobilised.
8.19. Within the United Kingdom-Netherlands
landing force, the RNLMC elements are:
l5
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(a) the first amphibious combat group,
trained for operations in mountainous
and Arctic regions;
(b) the Whiskey Company from 45 Com-
mando (the 'cold weather com-
pany "), small but parachute-capable;
(c) the special boat section, trained in
amphibious reconnaissance and under-
water demolition in Arctic waters in
winter;
(d) the landing craft detachment, trained
to support amphibious operations with
their assault landing craft.
(iii) Equipment
8.20. Equipment policy focuses on improving
standardisation and interoperability. Whenever
possible, the RNLMC procures British Royal
Marines equipment, but some equipment differ-
ences do remain. For example, the RNLMC is
equipped with the Dragon anti-tank system, the
Stinger anti-air missile, the 120 mm mortar and
the FN-762 mm rifle, but the British Royal
Marines use the Milan anti-tank system, the
Javelin air defence missile, the 105 mm light gun
and the new SAR-80 5.56 mm assault rifle. The
mountain and Arctic equipment (e.g. windproof
and wetproof clothing, cookers, tents), most
radio equipment" Arctic rations and over-snow
vehicles, howeveE are identical.
8.21. Although the perennial alliance problem of
standardisation/interoperability is solved to a
large extent by simply adopting one's partner's
equipment, occasional hiccups remain and one
such concerns the vital area of communications,
so important for command and control, as men-
tioned earlier. The Dutch were careful to adopt
the British'Clansman " radio system some time
ago, and may have difficulty in procuring its suc-
cessor 'Ptarmigan " as quickly as they might
wish: your Rapporteur hopes that a satisfactory
arrangement will be forthcoming which will
permit the excellent co-operation of past years to
continue as effectively in the future...
(iv) Training
8.22. The assumption that a unit able to operate
under the physical and mental demands of Arctic
conditions in northern Norway could operate in
any other part of the world proved to be true in
1982, during the Falklands conflict. Mountain-
and Arctic-trained RNLMC units deploy each
autumn to northern Scotland for mountain and
cold-/wet-weather operations. In winter, they
deploy for three months to northern Norway for
Arctic operations and ski-training.
8.23. There is an arrangement by which Dutch
and British Royal Marines and United States
Marines are able to serve in postings to their
" sister corps " and this is a model of its kind
which fully satisfies the suggestions in the
motion for a recommendation proposed by a
number of colleagues in the Assembly (see
Appendix). This is an excellent means of
improving alliance relationships in an eminently
practical way.
(v) Amphibious shipping issue
8.24. The 1972 memorandum of understanding
agreed that the United Kingdom would provide
shipping for the United Kingdom-Netherlands
landing force. The replacement of the two British
helicopter carriers 
- 
HMS Hermes and HMS
Bulwark 
- 
by the Invincible-class ASW carriers
may have produced, in theory, greater lift for
amphibious forces. However, these ships are
unlikely to do more in a time of tension than
quickly land a force and then revert to their main
ASW r6le. This would leave the landing force
coast-bound without the means to redeploy by
sea. In addition, Great Britain's assault ships 
-
HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid 
- 
are ageing
and need drastic updating, if not replacement, in
the 1990s.
8.25. Feasibility studies concerning extending
the service life of the two ships, as against con-
structing a new design ship, are under-way and
parallel studies il's sanmining helicopter lift and
the aviation support ship concepts. Amphibious
ships require extensive command, control and
communication facilities to co-ordinate the air
and surface aspects of this specialised type of
warfare. Consequently, they are too valuable to
carry the bulk of war supplies. Merchant ships
taken up from trade (STUFT) are more suitable
for this purpose (although with obvious draw-
backs when it comes to a beach landing). They
are hired in peacetime and would be comman-
deered in wartime. Within the United Kingdom-
Netherlands landing force, one-third of the
amphibious task force are ships taken up from
trade.
8.26. Amphibious shipping is a matter of great
concern in both Britain and the Netherlands at
present. The Dutch navy has developed a
concept for a landing-ship dock (LSD)-type ship.
This new ship would be able to transport an
ACG for longer periods at sea and would have
docking and flight deck capabilities. As with
plans for replacing British LPDs and in addition
commissioning two aviation-support ships 2,
nothing yet appears to have been decided.
(d) The Franco-German brigadc
8.27. The creation of the Franco-German
brigade should be seen in the context of
enhanced co-operation between the two coun-




tries in security and defence matters. The brigade
will be stationed in the B6blingen area south of
Stuttgart. The first general to command this
regular army brigade is French and his successors
will be German and French in turn. His second-
in-command, presently a German officer, will
also alternate German/French every two years.
8.28. The brigade will be configured to conduct
combined operations and therefore includes
infantry, artillery, armoured and engineering
units. Its 4 200 soldiers will be stationed in the
following garrisons:
- 
joint brigade headquarters in BobLingenjointheadquartenicompany as from October 1989
- 
German infantry battalion 
H RSlf"dE[*, ,r*
- 
French reconnaissance in B6blingen
squadron as from October 1990
- 
French infantry regiment 
;1 B;#tffiHfB8,
- 
French light armoured in Donaueschingen
regiment as from October 1990
- 
German engineer companv lt B3#"oTfl,Hf%r,
- 
French logistic company in Donaueschingen
ofthejoint logistic battalion as from October 1989
- German artillery battalion 
;x HS;| el#S,
- 
joint logistic battalion in Stetten
(except one French logistic as from October 1989
company)
- 
Germananti-tankcompany lt itll.6.ro*, ,r,,
- 
French trainine unit lt iTffro.ro*, ,r,
8.29 France will deploy two further regiments
in the Federal Republic so as to set up this
brigade. Because of the timescale, a regiment of
the French forces in Germany will be placed
under the authority of the brigade. As from 1991,
a French regiment will be transferred from
France to a garrison in the south-west of the
Federal Republic. With the transfer of these two
regiments, the brigade will receive additional
conventional combat forces for joint defence
purposes. (These two regiments will be seconded
from the force d'action rapide.)
8.30 The German units in the brigade will be
stationed mainly in Bdblingen as they come from
the 55 Territorial Brigade, which would have
been disbanded under the Federal Republic's
* Army 2000 " plan. (The territorial brigades
were set up originally to guard key points and, as
such, are part ofthe very few forces the Federal
Republic does not commit to NATO.) In
peacetime, the brigade's training prog;ramme will
be drawn up by the Franco-German military
co-operation group and the general commanding
the brigade will be in charge of implementation.
The brigade, an experimental formation, will
study and test options for tactical, operational
and logistic co-operation and interoperability in
the Centre Europe sector and principles appli-
cable to the training of formations composed of
units of different nationalities. [t will also be
given specific tasks including operations in thejoint defence context (in the area of NATO's
Central Army Group and Iandsouth).
8.31 At present, the headquarters element is in
place in Bdblingen and consists of only 50
officers and men. Their task is to work out the
various 6sdalities of making a political gesture
into military reality. Discipline, working rou-
tines, pay and allowances, uniform, etc., have to
be compatible 
- 
equipment also, beginning with
the different types of radio systems in service in
the French and German armies.
8.32 The particular advantage of this political
gesture is that it is having practical military con-
sequences and may succeed in making progress
in areas where the NATO Standardisation Com-
mittee has had only meagre results. The idea of
forming similarly bilateral brigades has also been
formulated by a number of other countries, and
the various stages of the Franco-German expe-
rience (brigade constituted by October 1990, first
manoeuwes at the beginning of l99l) will be
watched with great interest.
(e) Tlu NATO aiftorac early-waning force
8.33 In the early 1970s, studies directed by
NATO's major military commanders showed
that an airborne early-warning (AEW) radar
system would significantly enhance the alliance's
air defence capability. In December 1978, the
Defence Planning Committee signed a memo-
randum of understanding to buy and operate a
NATO-owned AEW system. By this decision the
member nations embarked on NATO's largest
commonly-funded acquisition programme.
8.34 The force was established in January 1980
and granted full NATO command headquarters
status by NATO's Defence Planning Committee
on lTth October 1980. Force Command Head-
quarters is collocated with Supreme Head-
quarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in
Mons, Belgium. While the force supports all
three major NATO commands Allied
Command Atlantic (ACLANT), Atlied




istrative control of the force.
8.35 The NATO E-3A component of the
command includes 18 Boeing NATO E-3A air-
craft. In addition, the British Govemment is
acquiring seven Boeing E-3D Sentry Mk I. The
Royal Air Force will form a second component
in the early 90s which \{,ill be manned by British
Royal Air Force personnel. The NATO E-3A
squadrons are manned by integrated interna-
tional crews from 1l nations (Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Nether-
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lands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United
States). Some 2 500 military and civilian per-
sonnel are now serving with the force. The E-3As
have been operating from the main operating
base (MOB) at Geilenkirchen, Germany, since
February 1982. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)
are located at Trapani, Italy; Preveza, Greece;
Konya, Turkey, and a forward operating location(FOL) at Oerland, Norway. When the unit
becomes operational, the main operating base(MOB) for the British component will be RAF
Waddington in Lincolnshire, United Kingdom.
8.36 France is also buyrng four of its own
AWACS and already has a liaison officer at
Geilenkirchen who has flown numerous mis-
sions with the integrated crews. It is understood,
however, that the first French t€ams are to be
trained in the United States which seems an
u'rnecessary step, especially as they will then
have to be cross-trained for the European theatre
where they will operate. Much better that both
aircraft and crews should take part from the start
in the alliance air defence system (as France has
done hitherto in the ground-based system). For-
tunately, there are signs that such a step may be
being considered at the highest level (the
French Minister of Defence, Mr. Jean-Pierre
Chevdnement, speaking in Paris recently has
stated:
o France, which in any event intends to
retain its freedom of decision, does not
belong to the integrated militaly structures
and does not intend to return to them,
although it wishes to improve co-oper-
ation with its allies, for instance in regard
to surveillance of airspace.').
8.37. Given the success of the tri-nation (United
Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany and
Italy) Tornado training unit at RAF Cottesmore
in the United Kingdom, and the four-nation(Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands,
Denmark and Canada) Lynx helicopter simu-
lator training establishment in the Netherlands, a
similar joint training initiative where AWACS is
concerned would be a positive step.
8.38. Italy is reported to be considering
investing also in AWACS and, should this be the
case, the AEW force in Europe will be second-
to-none in its potential, not only for standard
radar surveillance, but also as an alliance contri-
bution towards successful confidence-building
methods (even some aspects of verification could
be covered by the system).
8.39. When operating at an altitude of 30 000
feet (9 000 metres) a single aircraft can continu-
ously scan more than 312 000 square km(194000 square miles) of Earth's surface. Oper-
ating well within western airspace, such aircraft
will provide early warning about low-flyrng
intruders into the NATO are4 as well as high-
altitude coverage extending deep into Warsaw
Pact territory. While the force's principal r6le is
air surveillance, it provides economical commu-
nications support for air operations, including
counter-air, close air support, rescue, reconnais-
sance and airlift as well as surveillance and
control. Aircrews can exchange information with
ground- and sea-based commanders, since the
E-3A uses maritime mode radar to detect and
monitor enemy shipping.
8.40. The AEW radar is able to 'look down'
and separate moving targets from the stationary
ground clutter that confuses other radars. It adds
the ability to detect and track enemy aircraft
operating at low altitudes over all terrain, and to
identifr and give directions to friendly aircraft
operat'ng in the same area. In addition, its
mobility allows it to be deployed rapidly where it
is most needed, and makes it far less vulnerable
to attack than ground-based radar.
IX. Conclusion
9.1. The committee's principal conclusions are
set forth in the draft recommendations which
reflect the chanFng political, defence and eco-
nomic scene against which decisions are taken by
member governments. This report has as its title
'State of European security intervention
forces and reinforcement for the centre and the
north ", and it is obvious that the centre-north of
the European NATO area still occupies the
important place in alliance planning discerned
by previous rapporteurs of the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments. What is
changing however, is the emphasis now on
co-operation, not only in the realm of arma-
ments (where some 53 current projects involve
three or more allied nations), but more especially
in terms of people: men and women working
together, between nations, to ensure a joint
defence in the most cost-effective way.
9.2. The process should be encouraged and
amplified. This is the type of practical initiative
which the WEU Council might initiate in an
attempt to improve at least one aspect of the
* European pillar's " efficiency and effectiveness
in contributing to the alliance as a whole. As a
start, the now-regular meetings of deputy chiefs
of defence staffs should examine the recommen-
dations on the exchange of armed forces per-
sonnel between the national units of the indi-
vidual member nations (see Appendix) and
report to the Council on the ways and means for
implementation, as well as proposing the various
steps necesmry and a timescale to suit.
9.3. In parallel, those member nations which
still use a system of national service should look
at the practicalities of doing such 'national
service' in another member country, or at least
a proportion ofthat service, to inculcate a sense
of European co-operation and responsibility in
the defence field amongst those young people on





Exchange of arned forces personnel baween the national units
oI the individual member nations
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION
tabled by Dr. Hitschler and others under Rule 28 of the Rulcs of Procedare(7th December 1988, Document 1171)
The Assembly,
(t) Believing that additional measures must be adopted to promote partnership relations between the
individual member nations of WEU;
(it) Expressing its satisfaction at the creation of a joint Franco-German brigade which was initiated by
the formal decision on 13th November 1987 (formalised by an exchange of letters, dated,22td January
1988) by the heads of government of the two nations;(iit) Regretting the absence of similar arangements on the same scale between the other member
nations;
(iv) Asking for efforts to be undertaken aiming at enhancing co-operation between the units of the
other member nations, in order to strengthen and consolidate partnership relations, in particular to
improve mutual understanding through daily co-operation and the dismantling of language barriers, in
order to thus achieve an intermeshing of forces not only through liaison officers,
Rrcorrtpmvos rHAT rng CouNclI-
Take the initiative for the creation of exchange opportunities beyond the framework of integrated
headquarters and other available opportunities, in order for a great number of officers, non-
commissioned officers and other ranks to have the chance of doing duty for a limils6 period of their
service in units of allied armed forces.
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